An anti-regime demonstration on the 8th anniversary of the Syrian revolution in Paris on 17 March 2019. Image: Wikimedia Commons

Syria’s Fragile Dawn After Assad

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The Syrian revolution stands among one of the complex events in modern history characterized by its wide-ranging impact and a complex entanglement with regional and international actors in a region marked by decades of conflict. Its complexity lies in the clash of competing interests and the involvement of major global and regional powers, including Russia, Iran, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, among others.

Emerging as part of the Arab Spring—a wave of uprisings that swept the Arab world in early 2011—the Syrian revolution began as a spontaneous, peaceful movement demanding sweeping political and economic reforms. Like its counterparts across the region, it sought change through nonviolent protest.

However, the Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrators escalated the uprising into a multifaceted and devastating conflict. The ensuing violence has left hundreds of thousands dead or injured, destroyed vast swathes of the country, and forced millions of Syrians to flee their homes, sparking one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history.

This situation endured until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorial regime on December 8, last year. His ousting marked the beginning of a new transitional phase for Syria, one fraught with both significant challenges and potential opportunities. This article examines the Syrian revolution through multiple lenses, recognizing the immense complexity of this protracted and gory conflict—one that cannot be fully encapsulated within the scope of a single piece.

The Syrian Civil War was triggered by pro-democracy Arab Spring protests in March 2011 against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which used violence to suppress demonstrations, a large trail of death and destruction. Image: Mostafa Betaree

The Military Offensive

On the morning of 27 November 2024, a coalition of armed factions opposing the Syrian regime launched a surprise military operation targeting regime-held positions in the rural areas of Idlib and Aleppo. This operation marked a significant turning point, being the first of its kind since the revolution began in 2011. It was particularly notable for uniting the factions under a single military leadership known as the Military Operations Administration.

This coalition was initially established under the name “Fatah Mubin Operations Room” in 2019. It was responsible for coordinating and managing military operations in northern Syria, including Idlib, rural Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama since 2020.

In mid-2020, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the largest component of the operations room, issued a statement announcing the “unification of military efforts.” The group banned the formation of any other military faction or operations room in the areas under its control and centralized military activities within the Fatah Mubin Operations Room.

In a 2023 press conference, the group revealed a new structure for the military forces operating in the region, claiming that this move contributed to “achieving a balance of power in the area.” Later, the Military Operations Administration emerged with the announcement of the Deterrence Against Aggression campaign, which included the same factions previously part of the Fatah Mubin Operations Room.

The key factions in the coalition included:

1. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS): HTS is the most prominent and largest opposition faction. It is a military coalition composed of various Syrian armed groups formed by merging five factions: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, among others. Over time, additional brigades and units joined the coalition, along with influential religious figures.

2. The National Liberation Front (NLF): The NLF is an alliance comprising several Syrian opposition factions in Idlib, established in August 2018 amidst threats from the Syrian army to attack the area. The alliance includes major factions of the Free Syrian Army in northern Syria, such as Jabhat Tahrir Suriya and Jaysh Idlib al-Hur, along with active groups like Jaysh al-Ahrar, Liwa Suqour al-Sham, Tajammu Dimashq, and Nur al-Din al-Zinki Brigade.

3. Ahrar al-Sham Movement: Announced during the early stages of the armed revolution in 2011, Ahrar al-Sham describes itself as a “reformist Islamic movement.” It is one of the factions affiliated with the Islamic Front and defines itself as a comprehensive entity—military, political, and social—aimed at overthrowing Assad’s regime and establishing an Islamic state.

The opposition’s military operation reflects a long period of preparation, training, and planning. Initially, the operation aimed to seize certain areas from Assad’s forces, organized as a strategy to pressure the regime to halt its bombing of opposition-held territories and force it into negotiations. This goal is evident in the operation’s name: Deterrence Against Aggression.

However, the rapid and successive collapses of Assad’s forces and allied militias surprised everyone, including Russia and Iran (the regime’s primary backers), as well as the opposition factions themselves. This unexpected success led the opposition to expand their military operations.

Pivotal Events Leading to the Regime’s Collapse

The Role of Sweida: The predominantly Druze city of Sweida played a significant role in the regime’s rapid collapse, as its residents expelled Assad’s forces and declared the city outside the regime’s control.

Movements in Daraa and Rural Damascus: Simultaneously, armed factions in Daraa and rural Damascus expelled regime forces from these areas.

The Battle to Liberate Homs: While the Military Operations Administration was engaged in the Battle to Liberate Homs, part of its forces shifted towards Damascus after recognizing that the path to the capital was now open.

The Military Operations Administration redirected part of its forces from Homs directly to the capital, recognizing its symbolic and strategic importance. Seizing Damascus effectively meant the end of the war and the fall of the regime.

At dawn on December 8, the Military Operations Administration announced its entry into Damascus and the escape of Bashar al-Assad, officially ending one of the bloodiest chapters in Syria’s history—the Assad family’s 53-year rule and the Ba’ath Party’s grip on power since the March 8, 1963, coup.

Thus, Syria entered an entirely new phase, fraught with further complexities and challenges.

In addition to the victory achieved by the Military Operations Administration, other factors contributed to the regime’s downfall, most notably the withdrawal of Russian and Iranian support.

Why Russia and Iran Withdrew Their Support

The specific details behind this decision remain unclear. However, it appears that the conflict in Gaza played a significant role in reshaping regional dynamics, turning Assad into a liability rather than a useful ally—especially for Iran.

Iran’s disappointment with Assad grew due to his insufficient support for Gaza and Lebanon, which became evident in his recent stances.

Iran had gained significant influence in Syria due to its active role in preventing the regime’s early collapse at the start of the revolution. However, over time, Tehran began to feel its grip on Damascus weakening, as Assad increasingly pursued an independent path that often conflicted with Iran’s regional objectives.

Ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 25 January 2001. Image: Wikimedia Commons

Iran’s suspicions of Assad were further fueled by a series of leaks revealing the movements of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials, culminating in Israeli strikes targeting these officials in Syria. The Quds Force, which previously operated with relative freedom in Syria, started to face growing restrictions imposed by Syrian authorities. For example, Assad rejected demands to open a Golan front against Israel.

Perhaps most controversially, Damascus began imposing limits on Shiite religious activities across Syria, posing a direct challenge to Iran’s efforts to expand its ideological and cultural influence in the region.

Iran faced severe Israeli strikes, both directly (inside Iranian territory) and indirectly (in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen). These strikes aimed to dismantle the “unified resistance front against Israel” concept promoted by Saleh al-Arouri, a Hamas leader who was assassinated in Beirut by an Israeli strike on January 2, 2024.

As the bombing of Gaza intensified, Hezbollah escalated its operations, especially after Israeli strikes targeted areas inside Lebanon, including Beirut. The escalation continued, with Hezbollah suffering heavy losses, including high-level political and military leaders, culminating in the assassination of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. Beirut endured heavy bombardment, particularly in the southern suburbs, followed by an Israeli ground incursion.

Simultaneously, the region witnessed signs of a major escalation and the potential for a regional war between Iran and Israel, with both sides exchanging fire. Bashar al-Assad distanced himself from all these events, angering Iran and its allies. As mentioned earlier, the Syrian regime became more of a burden than an asset.

Russia’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine prevented it from allocating additional resources to avert Assad’s regime collapse, as it sought to avoid opening another complicated front in Syria.

Turkey’s Role

Turkey emerged as one of the most influential players in the Syrian conflict due to historical and geopolitical considerations. With a 909-kilometer shared border, Turkey holds vital interests in Syria, particularly concerning the Kurdish issue.

Turkey and Qatar supported the Syrian opposition from the outset, but Turkey’s role was notably more significant. Through agreements with Russia and Iran, Turkey ensured opposition control over Idlib and intervened militarily in 2020. It also provided essential resources to sustain normal life in opposition-held areas.

However, the Syrian refugee crisis—exceeding three million refugees in Turkey—sparked internal tensions and fueled anti-refugee sentiments, especially among Turkish nationalists.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly called for normalizing relations with Assad to address the refugee crisis. On Friday, October 25, Turkish broadcaster NTV reported that Erdogan asked President Putin to pressure Bashar al-Assad into accepting normalization with Turkey.

Additionally, Anadolu Agency quoted Erdogan during his return from visits to Saudi Arabia, where he attended the joint emergency summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League. In his statements, Erdogan reiterated his call to Assad.

Days before these calls, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz held discussions with UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen to push for a political solution in Syria based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Despite these calls, the Syrian regime rejected the proposals, reinforcing the assumption that the initial goal of the Deterrence Against Aggression operation was to force Assad to negotiate.

With the launch of the Deterrence Against Aggression campaign, various statements emerged regarding political solutions. The UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, stated that the current events are “a sign of collective failure to achieve what has been clearly required for years,” referring to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 from 2015.

Sean Savitt, spokesperson for the US National Security Council, declared that “the continued refusal of the Syrian regime to engage in the political process outlined in Resolution 2254, while relying on support from Russia and Iran, has led to the current collapses in the regime’s ranks in northwest Syria.”

Following Assad’s fall, Turkey immediately recognized the new administration, pledging cooperation to restore stability. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced plans to visit Syria soon, following groundwork laid by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin.

American and European Interests

Although differences exist between the policies of the Trump and Biden administrations, both generally agreed on a decreased focus on the Syrian file. What some perceived as contradictory stances were, in fact, clear expressions of Syria’s diminishing importance to the United States. The US positions oscillated between strong rhetoric from officials and periods of muted, ineffective responses, aligned with developments on the ground.

Initially, in response to the brutal repression of the civil revolutionary movement, the US and its European allies imposed a series of economic sanctions on the Syrian regime, which many viewed as ineffective. These policies continued in the same vein, emphasizing the necessity of a political solution.

The United States repeatedly rejected any form of normalization with Bashar al-Assad or lifting his international isolation. For instance, the US Congress passed the Caesar Act in 2019, prohibiting any form of normalization with Assad. The US President Biden signed the Captagon Act in 2022, aimed at combating drug production and smuggling linked to the Syrian regime.

Despite these laws and declared stances, the US did not prevent its Gulf allies from normalizing relations with the Assad regime or attempting to rehabilitate him internationally.

In summary, the US interests in Syria are concentrated in three key areas:

1. Oil: By supporting Kurdish forces, the U.S. ensured control over Syrian oil fields after Assad ceded them in exchange for Kurdish neutrality during the revolution.

2. Kurds: The U.S. provided significant support to Kurdish forces as part of its regional strategy to stabilize the region and counteract the Syrian regime’s influence.

3. Counterterrorism: The U.S. led an international coalition against terrorism, targeting ISIS and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Concerns Over the New Syrian Administration

The sudden rise of the new Syrian administration, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), designated as a terrorist organization, alarmed the United States.

Due to the influx of refugees, European countries temporarily froze asylum applications while awaiting developments in Syria. On December 9, the Dutch government announced the suspension of asylum procedures for Syrians. Dutch Minister of Migration Marjolein Faber stated on RTL Radio that the Netherlands would begin repatriating Syrians once Syria is deemed safe.

Predicting the future trajectory of Syria after Assad’s fall is extremely difficult. However, it is certain that the new reality will have local, regional, and international ramifications.

Locally:

Nature of the New Administration: Will it resemble the Islamic model of the Taliban, or will it adopt a modern, secular, and civil approach that ensures the participation of all Syrian factions? While predictions are challenging, the positive messages from the new administration’s leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, are noteworthy. He emphasized that his administration would be a transitional phase preparing for drafting a new constitution and holding free elections.

Managing the Transition: How will the new administration handle this challenging phase, particularly in addressing significant challenges such as, reconstruction, refugee return, rebuilding infrastructure, and reviving a devastated economy.

Addressing Social Fabric Issues: Years of war have made Syria’s complex social fabric even more intricate, particularly with the concerns of religious and ethnic minorities regarding the new reality.

Regionally:

Iran’s Reaction: Will Iran accept its loss in Syria, which dealt a severe blow to its regional project, or will it exploit Alawite and Shiite minorities to maintain a foothold in Syria?

Future Syrian Israeli Conflict: What is the future of the conflict between new Syria and Israel, especially after Israel unilaterally suspended the 1974 disengagement agreement?

Arab States’ Stance on Syria: Will Arab countries adopt the same approach they used with changes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya?

Internationally:

Russia’s Role Post-Assad: Will Russia lose interest in Syria? Will it abandon its gains there, including its long-held dream of maintaining a Mediterranean foothold?

The United States: Will the US increase its focus on this region, or will it maintain its current level of involvement?

All these questions and more remain unanswered, making predictions about the next phase highly uncertain, if not impossible.

Sources cited:

Al Jazeera: Comprehensive coverage of the Syrian revolution and the fall of Assad’s regime: https://www.aljazeera.com/politics/2024/12/8/how-bashar-al-assads-regime-collapsed-in-12-days

France 24: Coverage of the regime’s fall and its implications: https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241208-the-fall-of-bashar-al-assad-in-syria-international-reactions-and-implications

Al Arabiya: Regular coverage of political and military developments in Syria: https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2024/12/08/why-did-the-syrian-army-retreat-expert-analysis

Sky News Arabia: Analysis of Assad’s fall and political changes: https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1765196-future-of-syria-post-assad

Carnegie Middle East Center: In-depth research on Iranian and Russian influence in Syria: https://carnegie-mec.org/2024/12/bashar-al-assad-of-syria-has-been-ousted-from-power

The New Arab: Detailed reports on political developments after Assad’s fall: https://www.newarab.com/news/syria-after-assad-diplomatic-moves-unveiling-regime-abuses

Reuters: International reports on foreign interventions in Syria: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-opposition-forces-enter-damascus-assad-flees-2024-12-08/

Human Rights Watch: Reports on human rights issues related to the Syrian conflict: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/09/syria-assad-fall-opportunity-justice

Mostafa Betaree

Mostafa is a Palestinian-Syrian-Dutch refugee and human rights advocate. He serves as a Community Advisory Board member at the European Network on Statelessness and is also a senior fellow at the UN OHCHR. In 2018, he founded Spotlight Team International Art in the Netherlands, where he leads as a director, trainer, and program coordinator in refugee camps. He holds a Master’s degree in Human Resources and a bachelor’s degree in Economics, Politics, and Business Administration, complemented by formal studies in music and dance.

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